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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant was injured while stopped in her car
at a red light by defendant-respondent's truck crashing into
her vehicle from the rear.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW
The matter came on for trial on November 29, 1979.

Sum-

mary Judgment was granted at the closing of evidence as to
defendant's liability.

Damages were returned by the jury in

the amount of $1,000 general damages, medicals in the sum of
$688 and minimal loss of earnings in the amount of $100.

Sub-

sequently, plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Additur or New
Trial Based on Inadequate Damages was denied by the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff-appellant seeks an order requiring a new trial
on which plaintiff-appellant's damages may be awarded as established by the evidence, unless defendant-respondent agrees to
additur in an amount found by this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues of liability were sufficiently clear that the
court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff at the conclusion of evidence.
During the afternoon of December 7, 1977, plaintiffappellant was driving south on Redwood Road approaching other

-1-
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southbound traffic stopped for a light at 35th South.
stopped without incident.

She

Traveling behind her, defendant-

respondent failed to react to her stopping, applied his brakes
belatedly and struck the rear of her car with his pick-up
truck.

She was knocked unconscious, came to, and passed out

again.

(Tr. P6, L6-20- P9, Ll4-24)

She was taken by ambu-

lance to the Valley West Hospital where she was later released
that day.

(Tr. PlO, L2 4-Pll, L2)

Subsequent to the accident, she received medical treatment for injuries arising from the accident from her family
physician, Dr. Isaacson, until he left private practice, and
then from an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Thomas Soderberg.
She has also received physical therapy from Larry Brown, R.P.T.,
and therapy from a chiropractor, Dr. Jean Wayman.
After the accident, she continued to work through December and January, and then upon advice of her doctor, and the work
related pain, and inability to do her work safely, she left her
employment to convalesce.

(Tr. P29, L5-P31, LlO)

She was out

of work from January 13, 1978, through May 20, 1978.

Since the

date of the accident, she has been unable to maintain a job
as a driver, a skill she is proud of, a skill that has paid her
more than other jobs she has maintained.
stockcar racing and truck driving.

Her experience included

She can build an

engine.

(Tr. P34, Ll4-22)

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Her wage losses were approximately $800 for 15 weeks lost
at $3.55 an hour (Tr. P28, L26)
every four weeks.

at approximately 110 hours

(Tr. P27, Lll).

There was no contradicting testimony to appellant's evidence concerning her injuries.
Appellant described as extreme the pain she felt immediately following the impact (Tr. P9, LlS-PlO, L23).
the only point of contradiction,

defendan~

This was

testifying that she

didn't seem to be in trouble at the accident scene.
She also testified that she had to give up the employment
she then had as a bus driver because operating the bus put her
in pain and, even worse, limitation in moving her head to see
other traffic caused her to scrape the bus twice against other
cars.
dent.

She gave up that job voluntarily after the second acci(Tr. P31, L4-10)

At time of trial, she had become self-

employed, with her husband, painting signs.

She had pain doing

many of the mechanical requirements of this, and was substantially limited in her ability to work for continuous periods
as the pain progressed with certain kinds of activities.
P40, Ll-P41, Ll7)

(Tr.

Finally, she described the pain she felt

at time of trial as being repeated headaches, pain caused by
activities involving bending her neck, and painful difficulty
in such simple activities as opening jars and dressing herself.
(Tr. P41, Ll3-P42,L4).
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ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT CAN DIRECTLY
REACH THE HEART OF RULE 59, UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND ORDER ADDITUR
WHEN APPROPRIATE.
The pertinent

points of Rule 59 are as follows:

11

A. Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any
of the following causes:
11

!(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice and,
"(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is against
the law. 11
Can the Utah Supreme Court directly address the issue of
a jury verdict which inadequately compensates a plaintiff?
Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 U2d 42, 327 P2d 826, at

In

2d 47, the Court

answered:
"Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the limits
of any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by
the evidence, it should not be permitted to stand,
and if the trial court fails to rectify it, we are
obliged to make the correction on appeal."
There the plaintiff was awarded the "munificent" sum of
what added up to $31 for two weeks illness from eating sausage
negligently prepared by the defendant Suhrmann.

The Supreme

Court ordered additur.
Where

does the court derive such power?

"In such instances, the courts exercise their inherent supervisory powers over jury ~erd~cts~ which derive from their duty to see that JUSt1ce is done; and
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make corrective orders necessary for that purpose.
This is done by the trial court, or upon its failure
to do so, by this court on appeal."
id. U2d 45.
In accord see King v. Union Pac. R. Co., 117 u 40, 12 P2d
692 and Brown v. Johnson, 24 U2d 388, 472 P2d 942.
Appellant's medical testimony was given by a specialist in
orthopedics.

He testified that she would have a permanent 10%

degree of disability resulting solely, proximately and directly
from the subject accident.
painful.

The disability would be inherently

In fact, he testified that the presence of pain as

appellant attempted to move would be the primary factor in limiting her freedom of movement.

Appellant has sustained pain ever

since the accident occurred caused by the accident.

(Tr. P29,

L6-Pl07, L26)
Notwithstanding this evidence, the jury awarded $1,000 in
general damages.

Such an award could not cover to a small degree

pain to date of trial.

It would not at all begin to cover an

award for a permanent and painful disability for appellant's 30
year life expectancy.
to this evidence.

Clearly, the jury verdict does not relate

It had to reject it and substitute its own

conclusion that plaintiff wasn't injured to any real degree past
or future.

Is the law and evidence such that the verdict should

stand?
POINT II.
THE CRITERIA FOR SETTING ASIDE JURY
VERDICTS JUSTIFY ADDITUR OR NEW TRIAL.
Evidence cannot be precisely measured and jurors are bound
to have disparate views of the same evidence as noted by Justice
Crockett in his concurrence in Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U2d at 435,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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326 P2d 722.

But there the main opinion viewed the evidence and held:
"We are of the opinion that this accident never should
have happened; it was preventable. A careful review of
the evidence leads us to the conclusion that defendant
either did not see this child when he said he did, or
was not going as slowly as he claims he was, or that
he failed to do everything possible to avoid striking
plaintiff by bringing his car to a stop as soon as
possible or by turning to the right."
id. U2d 438.
Therefore, the court could say that:
"Here we are hot confronted with evidence that is equally convincing in its weight.
In this case, the demand
of Rule 59(a) is fully satisfied--the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict."
Jury verdict was then reversed.
The Utah Supreme Court identified the elements to be considered in modifying a verdict as a matter of law in Jensen v.
D & RG Ry Co, 44 U 100, 138 P 1185.

There, in addressing the

trial court's obligations at post trial motions, the court
stated that the verdict should be corrected where it was "clear
that the jury has misapplied or failed to take into account
proven facts, or has made findings clearly against the weight
of the evidence, so that the verdict is offensive to his sense
of justice to the extent he cannot permit it in conscience to
stand."
Jensen dealt with a jury verdict both in areas of liability and damages.
Looking at cases on damages, in Paul v. Kirkendall,
1 U2d 1, 261 P2d 670, this court reaffirmed its position saying:
-6-
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"If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict ...
shows a disregard ... of the evidence or the instructions ... such as to satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered under such disregard or misapprehen~ion of the evidence or influence of passion or
prejudice, then the court may exercise its discretion
in the interest of justice and grant a new trial."
Also in accord is Saltas v. Affleck, 99 U 381, 105 P2d
176, wherein a jury award of $800 for the death of plaintiff's
son was increased by additur to $2,400.
POINT III.
THE CRITERIA FOR SETTING ASIDE JURY
VERDICT DEMAND ACTION IN THIS CASE
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE.
Appellant does not hide from the fact that appellate
courts are reluctant to overturn decisions based upon the findings of a trier of fact.

In this case, what other facts are

there on damages?

To find that the evidence supporting

None.

her case is not credible is to find that she is not credible,
her son is not credible, and Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg is not
credible.
Defendant made no effort to bring any doctor, neighbor
or investigator to limit, rebut or impeach a word of their
testimony.
In some cases, no rebuttal is necessary, claims fall of
their own weight for various reasons such as impeachment,
absurdity and so on, but here no factual reasons are in the
record, nor credibly implied from it.
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The verdict is simply contrary to the evidence and, as
such, denies appellant the "fair and adequate" compensation
wrongdoers are required to pay their victims,and should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
There is not an issue of liability.
issue of causal relation of damages.
they were awarded by the jury.

There is not an

For such as they are,

This issue is simply whether

the amount of damages awarded by the jury is in accordance
with the evidence.

Plaintiff-appellant maintains that an

award of $1,000 for damages in which she has already suffered
pain for two years preceding the trial and from all the medical evidence at trial, will suffer pain in the future, is such
a "munificent" sum as to require this court to fulfill the
duty neglected by the trial court.
additure or a new trial.

There should be either

Rule 59 and its interpretive cases

require it.
DATED May 8, 1980.
JAMES E. HAWKES
MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed 3 OJpiesof the foregoing Appellant's Brief to
Frank N. Karras, attorney for defendant-respondent, 321 South
600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, May 8, 1980.
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